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In some new political economic models, delays of stabilizations result from 
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inflation are identified as important determinants of the timing of inflation 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
 One intriguing fact that is common to many chronic inflation countries is that 
they have followed potentially unsustainable policies for extended periods of time. 
These policies include large budget deficits that lead to rapidly growing debt to GDP 
ratios and hyperinflation. Although these policies are recognized as suboptimal from a 
social standpoint, the necessary (and welfare-improving) stabilizations are often delayed 
or not fully implemented. Many economists explain these suboptimal policies by 
accusing politicians of myopia or irrational behavior. Others argue that countries lack 
the expertise necessary to carry out the reforms, hope that things will get better by 
themselves, or wait for a larger crisis that would force them to act. 
 Needless to say, these explanations are not very convincing. A new political 
economic literature has developed formal models that try to explain the adoption of 
suboptimal policies by rational and forward looking agents who do the best they can in 
the game being played.1 These models depart from the assumption of a social planner 
choosing policies according to a social welfare function, and assume, instead, that 
policy choices tend to be the result of negotiations between contending interest groups 
with conflicting interests. Then, deviations from optimality are explained by 
coordination problems caused by the mechanisms of making collective choices. 
 These models also have testable implications. Many of them focus on the 
influence of political factors on the timing of stabilizations: fragmentation or 
polarization of the political system; political instability; type of regime; political 
orientation of the government; and time in office. Others are related to economic 
factors: intensity of the crisis (level of inflation) or the amount of foreign reserves 
available. Although previous studies have tested the effects of political instability and 
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fragmentation on seigniorage, budget deficits, debt, or inflation, no direct tests of the 
influence of these factors on the timing of stabilizations have been undertaken. 
 In this paper, I employ a probit model to empirically investigate the influence of 
political and economic variables on the probability of starting a stabilization program. 
Since higher probabilities of reform in any given time interval will be associated with 
shorter delays in the implementation of reform after the onset of high inflation, the 
analysis also helps to explain the existence of delays in the adoption of stabilization 
plans. The empirical results of this investigation are compared with the testable 
implications of the theoretical models, so that we can discriminate among them. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section B presents a description of the recent 
theories of delayed stabilization and reform. The empirical analysis is described in 
section C, and the conclusions of this paper are presented in section D. 
 
B. DELAYED STABILIZATION 
There are essentially three alternative ways of explaining delays of stabilizations 
or reforms. The first simply assumes myopia or irrationality of policymakers. This 
approach is theoretically unappealing and empirically vacuous – it offers no 
constructive explanation of the phenomenon. The second, based on an optimal control 
framework, assumes that delays are the rational and deliberate choice of a policymaker 
maximizing a social welfare function. In these models, delay is optimal if the costs of 
living under inflation are smaller than the costs of implementing a successful 
stabilization program. Finally, political models of conflict assume that policy choices 
result from negotiations between contending interest groups, and explain deviations 
from optimality (delays) by coordination problems caused by the mechanisms of 
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making collective choices. Examples of the last two types of models are discussed 
further below. 
 Although most of this literature deals with stabilization as a reduction in the 
budget deficit or the ratio of public debt to GDP (fiscal stabilization), their conclusions 
are also applicable to inflation stabilization, which is the main focus of this paper. 
Furthermore, in most of the countries suffering from chronic inflation, large budget 
deficits lead to ever-growing debt to GDP ratios and hyperinflation (through 
monetization), meaning that an inflation stabilization program can only succeed if it is 
accompanied by fiscal stabilization (see: Veiga, 1999). Thus, this literature produces 
several testable implications that can be applied to inflation stabilization episodes. 
These implications are presented below and summarized in Table 1. 
 
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
 
1) Higher fragmentation of the political system leads to delays of stabilizations 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) present a model in which delays of fiscal 
stabilization result from the failure of rival interest groups to agree on a deficit 
reduction program. This stalemate leads to a “war of attrition” in which agreement on a 
stabilization program is only reached when one of the groups concedes, that is, accepts 
paying a higher proportion of the taxes in order to eliminate the deficit. In this model, 
one important factor leading to delays is the degree of political polarization among 
interest groups. 
Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) present a political model of tax 
reforms in which strategic considerations may induce the current government to leave 
an inefficient tax system to its successors (in the presence of political instability and 
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polarization). This will limit their availability of funds and, therefore, decrease spending 
on areas that are not favored by the incumbent policymaker. Thus, tax reform is delayed 
when the incumbent faces small probability of reelection and high polarization. Their 
empirical results show that after controlling for a set of structural variables countries 
with more unstable political systems tend to rely more on seigniorage.2 
 Since contending interest groups tend to be represented by political parties, the 
multitude of parties represented in the parliaments of fragmented party systems are 
associated with a high degree of political polarization and instability of these systems3, 
which in the models discussed above would lead to greater delays of stabilizations. 
 
2) Higher inflation hastens stabilizations 
Drazen and Grilli (1993) extend the model of Alesina and Drazen (1991) 
emphasizing the possible benefits of economic crises. As higher costs of delay hasten 
stabilizations (by revealing the loser faster) an exogenous shock that aggravates the 
economic conditions may be welfare improving if the welfare costs of the shock are 
more than compensated for by the benefits of earlier stabilization. Since higher inflation 
results in higher costs of delaying stabilization, one should observe stabilizations 
starting faster as inflation gets higher (assuming no efforts by the government to reduce 
the costs of inflation through indexation or other means).4 
 
3) Level of foreign reserves 
 Orphanides (1996a,b) examines delay and abandonment of a stabilization 
program as optimal decisions by a policymaker. He argues that it may be better to delay 
the program if more favorable initial conditions are expected: either the adjustment may 
become less painful, or political support may increase when the costs of inflation are 
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fully recognized by the public. An empirical implication is that a more severe inflation 
is likely to induce a reform effort sooner (the testable hypothesis discussed above). 
Further, in the Orphanides models, if a prospective reform is to be accomplished via the 
management of the exchange rate, the level of foreign reserves (subject to stochastic 
shocks) will be a critical factor. This offers the empirical prediction that low levels of 
foreign reserves will result in delayed or abandoned stabilization programs. 
 
4) Stabilization comes faster in authoritarian regimes than in democracies 
 Haggard and Kaufman (1992) argue that the security of governments and their 
independence from the short-run distributive political pressures has great effects on the 
level and variability of inflation over the long run. Furthermore, governments in less 
fragmented political systems, such as authoritarian regimes, are less exposed to those 
political pressures and need not waste time building consensus for reform. Thus, 
stabilization programs should be easier to implement in authoritarian regimes. 
 
5) Rightist governments are more prone to stabilize than leftist ones 
This hypothesis is related to the partisan model of Hibbs (1977) that suggests 
that rightist parties care more about inflation that leftist parties do. 
 
6) Governments are more prone to stabilize in the beginning of their terms  
According to the opportunistic political business cycle of Nordhaus (1975)5 
governments tend to implement the toughest measures in the beginning of their terms, 
hoping short-term hardships will be largely forgotten by the time of the next election.  
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C. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 The empirical analysis consists of using a duration model to test the hypotheses 
related to the models discussed in the previous section. Probit and proportional hazards 
specifications will be estimated for a panel of 10 countries and 27 inflation stabilization 
programs in order to determine which variables cause delays in the adoption of 
stabilization plans. 
 
1) The Data 
Before estimating the probit and proportional hazards specifications, two major 
empirical issues had to be solved. The first was to determine when inflation was “high”, 
that is, when a stabilization program was clearly necessary. High inflation was defined 
as twice the average inflation rate of the last 10 years (inflation much higher than usual) 
or greater than or equal to 100% (a high level by most standards). Other definitions of 
high inflation will be used in the sensitivity analysis. The second issue was to determine 
when a stabilization program had been undertaken. Since the governments that 
implemented most of these programs usually publicized them extensively, it is not 
difficult to identify their starting dates. The approach followed here was to collect 
information on the starting dates of all of the important stabilizations undertaken in 
countries suffering from chronic inflation. These major stabilizations have been 
previously identified in a considerable number of articles on inflation stabilization.6 
 The list of stabilization plans analyzed in this article is shown in Table 2. The 
second column indicates the quarter in which the plans were implemented and the third 
column indicates whether the stabilization was exchange rate based or money based. 
The last column indicates the number of consecutive quarters of high inflation that 
preceded the start of a stabilization plan. Those stabilizations that were implemented 
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when inflation was not high according to my definition have duration of high inflation 
of zero quarters. 
 
<< Insert Table 2 around here >> 
 
 For each country, quarterly data was collected from the first quarter of 1957 
(first quarter for which quarterly data is available) until the fourth quarter of 1996. A 
description of the variables used in this paper and their sources is presented in Table 3. 
Quarterly data are not always available for some of the countries studied, but annual 
data usually are. In order to make possible the inclusion of these data in the data set, 
straight-line interpolation was used to generate quarterly data.7 The variables for which 
interpolation was used are real GDP growth and Fiscal Balance as a percentage of the 
GDP. Even after interpolating annual data for these variables there are still a few 
missing values. Observations for which there are missing values have been excluded 
from the probit estimations. 
 
<< Insert Table 3 around here >> 
 
2) Probit model 
 In order to determine which factors influence the timing of an inflation 
stabilization program, I use a binary probit model to estimate the effect of a set of 
political and economic variables on the probability of starting a stabilization program in 
a given quarter, when inflation is high. Observations in the data set include only those 
quarters occurring between the onset of high inflation and the adoption of a subsequent 
reform plan. 
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 An individual inflation spell contains all the consecutive quarters in which 
inflation was high according to my definition, until a stabilization plan started or 
inflation ceased to be high. For each quarter and inflation spell the dependent variable 
(STAB) takes the value of one if a stabilization plan was implemented in that quarter, 
and zero if it was implemented after that quarter. If no stabilization is implemented, 
STAB takes the value of zero for all the observations in that inflation spell. 
I start by assuming that the unobserved hazard rate, the conditional probability 
that a stabilization program is implemented at time t given that it has not been 
implemented before, depends only on the explanatory variables. It does not change 
autonomously over time and any variation must be due to the independent variables. 
The main explanatory variables used were the following: 
- Frag=1 and Frag=2: dummies for the fragmentation of the political 
system;8 
- F.Ind: fragmentation index; 
- Ln(Inf): log of growth in CPI since the same quarter of the previous year; 
- TR/Imp: total foreign reserves as a percentage of imports; 
- Type: dummy for type of regime (authoritarian or democracy); 
- Orient: partisan (left-right) orientation of the government;9 
- Right: dummy for right or center right government; 
- QLCH: number of quarters since last change in government or election; 
- QLCH≤4: dummy for change in government or election in the last four 
quarters; 
I also consider two variables that were not identified directly in the theoretical 
discussion, but which might affect the timing of a stabilization. These variables are: 
- FB/GDP: Fiscal Balance as a percentage of GDP; 
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- GDP: real GDP growth since same quarter of previous year. 
Table 1 shows the hypotheses to which these variables are related and the expected 
signs of the coefficients and Table 3 presents a more complete description of the 
variables and respective sources. All economic variables were lagged because the start 
of a stabilization program could affect their contemporaneous values. 
 Table 4 shows the results of the probit estimations. Since probit coefficients are 
not very intuitive, the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable, STAB, are also reported. The latter give the effects of one-unit changes in the 
regressors on the probability of starting a stabilization program (expressed in percentage 
points) evaluated at the mean of the data. For dummy variables, they correspond to the 
effect in that probability when the dummy changes from 0 to 1. T-statistics for the null 
of no effect and the significance levels at which the null hypotheses are rejected are also 
reported. 
 
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
 
 Results support my first testable hypothesis that higher fragmentation decreases 
the probability of starting a stabilization program (that is, leads to delays).10 Frag=1 
and Frag=2 are always statistically significant and the estimated coefficients have the 
expected signs. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient of Frag=1 is always greater than 
that of Frag=2, as expected. This indicates that authoritarian regimes that did not allow 
political parties tend to stabilize faster, providing some support for the fourth 
hypothesis. The other measure of fragmentation, F.Ind11, is used in column 5. Its 
coefficient has the expected sign and is marginally significant (10% significance level), 
providing some evidence that the proliferation of parties in the parliament leads to 
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delays of stabilizations. A one-unit increase in the index decreases the probability of 
starting a stabilization by 2.52 percentage points. In column 6, Frag=1 and Frag=2 
were included along with F.Ind. Results are very similar to those of column 1 for the 
two dummy variables but F.Ind is not statistically significant and has the wrong sign. 
Thus, when the two measures of fragmentation are used at the same time, the dummy 
variables based on Frag seem to work better that F.Ind. 
 The first lag of the natural logarithm of inflation, Ln(Inf(-1)), is always 
statistically significant and has a positive coefficient, as expected, supporting the second 
testable hypothesis that stabilization comes faster as inflation gets higher. 
TR/Imp(-1) has the wrong sign and is never statistically significant, providing no 
support for Orphanides (1996a,b) hypothesis that the decision on starting or postponing 
a stabilization depends upon the available level of reserves. Although the ratio of total 
reserves to imports may not be a perfect indicator of the amount of reserves available, it 
gives an idea of the capacity of one nation to keep financing its imports. Furthermore, it 
is one of the best proxies available that can be compared across countries of different 
sizes. 
Type12 has the wrong sign and is not statistically significant, which goes against 
the hypothesis that authoritarian regimes in general tend to stabilize faster. Thus, it 
seems that the hypothesis that authoritarian regimes tend to stabilize faster than 
democracies is not supported in general (for all authoritarian regimes). But, as 
mentioned above, authoritarian regimes that did not allow political parties do seem to 
stabilize faster, providing support for a restricted version of the hypothesis.13 
 Orient (orientation of the government) has the expected sign but is never 
statistically significant, providing no support for the fifth testable hypotheses that 
governments leaning more towards the right tend to stabilize faster. A dummy variable, 
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Right, that takes the value of one when Orient is equal to one or two (right or center 
right governments) was also used. Again, no support was found for the above-
mentioned hypothesis. 
QLCH (quarters since last change in government or election) also has the 
expected sign but is only marginally significant in the estimation of column 5. 
Therefore, I find little or no support for the hypothesis that governments tend to 
stabilize early in their terms. I also introduced a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if a change in government or election occurred in the last 4 quarters, QLCH≤4, in 
order to test whether stabilizations tended to be implemented in the first year after 
assuming power. Again, no support was found for my last testable hypothesis. 
 As for the control variables, FB/GDP(-1) has the expected sign but is only 
marginally significant in four of the six estimations. GDP(-1) also has the expected sign 
and is always statistically significant at the 5% level. 
It should be noted that the estimations of Table 4, as well as those of Tables 5,6 
and 7, do not include country dummies because no evidence of country fixed effects 
was found when these were accounted for. The country dummies were never 
statistically significant individually or jointly, and nothing substantive changes when 
they are included.14 
 Table 5 presents the results of a sensitivity analysis in which several variants of 
the model of column 2 of Table 4 are estimated. First, alternative definitions of high 
inflation were used: over twice the average inflation rate of the last five years or greater 
than 100% (column 1); or, simply, above 50% (column 2) or 100% (columns 3 and 4). 
Second, Israel and Turkey were excluded from the sample, so that one could verify if 
conclusions held when only Latin American countries were included (column 5). Third, 
Mexico and the Dominican Republic were excluded, so that only South American 
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countries would remain (column 6). And, fourth, all observations before 1970 were 
excluded (column 7). Since most of the problems with chronic inflation started or 
became more severe in the 1970s, leading to the implementation of stabilization 
programs in several countries, I check whether results are affected by not considering 
the earlier stabilizations. 
 
<< Insert Table 5 around here >> 
 
Results for most of the tested hypothesis changed little. Although Frag=1 is not 
statistically significant in column 3 (Inf≥100%), it is shown in column 4 that higher 
fragmentation still increases delays: the new dummy variable, Frag≤2, that takes the 
value of one when Frag is equal to 1 or 2, is highly significant. Inflation remains highly 
significant in most estimations, providing support for the hypothesis that higher 
inflation hastens stabilizations. The major difference is that the evidence for the 
hypothesis that stabilizations come faster in authoritarian regimes is reduced: the 
coefficient on Frag=1 is not significant in the third column and it is smaller than the 
one associated with Frag=2 in columns 1 and 7. 
Table 6 shows the results when only Exchange Rate Based Stabilizations are 
considered. First, Orphanides (1996a,b) models are tested using three different proxies 
for the availability of reserves: total reserves as a percentage of imports (column 1), 
change in total reserves since the same quarter of the previous year (column 2), and 
percentage deviation from trend15 of total reserves (column 3). None of these variables 
is statistically significant. Second, the influence of IMF credit is taken into account by 
looking at quarterly data of Total Fund Credit and Loans Outstanding (TFC) and at the 
occurrence of IMF arrangements with the countries included in the sample. Columns 4 
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and 5 show that the lag of the level and of the change in Total Fund Credit do not affect 
the probability of starting a stabilization (results are the same for other lags and moving 
averages of TFC). Concluding an arrangement with the IMF in the year of the 
observation does not have a significant effect either (column 6). The same applies for 
IMF arrangements in previous years. 
 
<< Insert Table 6 around here >> 
 
 These results seem to indicate that the availability of foreign exchange reserves 
and IMF credit or arrangements are not important for the decision to start a stabilization 
program. Nevertheless, we should not completely discard that possibility. First, the 
expected level of reserves, on which we have no data, may be more important than the 
actual level of reserves. Second, Casella and Eichengreen (1996) argue that both the 
timing of the decision to provide aid and of the actual transfer of funds matter. Since the 
only information we have is the year in which an arrangement was agreed upon, we 
cannot appropriately test whether the actual provision of foreign aid affects the timing 
of stabilization programs. 
I also performed a considerable number of robustness tests and sensitivity 
analyses not reported here.16 First, quarterly growth in CPI was used instead of growth 
in CPI since the same quarter of the previous year. Second, growth in money since the 
same quarter of the previous year was used instead of growth in the CPI. Third, current 
account balance as a percentage of GDP, growth in exports, and growth in imports were 
added to the list of explanatory variables, either one at a time or all at the same time. 
Fourth, because results could be sensitive to interpolation methods, I reestimated the 
model using only observations for which quarterly data was available, or using only 
  15
annual data. Finally, as any definition of high inflation is necessarily arbitrary, I also 
estimated the results using all observations available or all non-stabilization quarters 
(those in which a stabilization was not already under way), instead of using just the high 
inflation quarters. The conclusions of the analysis are unchanged in these alternative 
estimations. 
 
3) Probit with time dummies 
 In the estimations described above I assumed that the probability of starting a 
stabilization plan in a given quarter did not change autonomously over time, meaning 
that any variation had to be due to changes in the explanatory variables. A simple way 
to allow that probability to change over time, even when the independent variables are 
held constant, is to create a set of dummy variables accounting for the passage of time 
and include them in the probit model.17 Since the duration of high inflation before a 
stabilization was never longer than seven years (the longest one was of 27 quarters), 
seven year dummies reflecting the duration of high inflation before stabilization were 
created and six were included in the list of independent variables.18 
 Results are shown in columns 1 to 3 of Table 7, which should be compared with 
columns 1 to 3 of Table 4. Frag=1 and Frag=2 are now highly significant and their 
estimated coefficients are larger than before. Ln(Inf(-1))  remains significant, but at a 
lower level. Orient, Right, QLCH, QLCH≤4, and TR/Imp(-1) are not significant. 
FB/GDP(-1) is always significant at the 5% level and GDP(-1) is only marginally 
significant. Finally, the time dummies for the first and third years are always significant, 
meaning that the passage of time does affect the hazard rate. In short, the introduction of 
year dummies in the regressions reinforced the support for the hypothesis that higher 
fragmentation reduces the probability of starting a stabilization program (increases 
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delays) and did not change considerably the support found for the other testable 
hypotheses. 
 
<< Insert Table 7 around here >> 
 
4) Proportional hazards model19 
 Although the life of a stabilization plan is a continuous-time process, available 
data is discrete, meaning that the best that can be done is to work with data grouped into 
time intervals. For the countries involved, the smallest time interval for which it was 
possible to gather data for most of the variables used was one quarter. Then, the strategy 
followed was to assume an underlying continuous-time model and estimate its 
parameters by methods that take into account the discrete character of the data. Our first 
approach was to estimate a probit model. 
 While a probit model has the advantage of being easily estimated by most of the 
statistical software packages available, it might not be the most correct model to apply 
in the present case. Estimated coefficients are not necessarily the discrete-time 
equivalent of the underlying continuous-time model and the coefficient vector is not 
invariant to the length of the time intervals, meaning that the choice of the time interval 
(quarters in the present case) may affect estimated coefficients. 
 Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) developed a grouped data (discrete-time) version 
of the proportional hazards model that does not suffer from the problems of the probit 
model noted above. This model is expressed as follows: 
 ( )[ ]P xit t it= − − +1 exp exp 'α β , (1) 
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where Pit is the probability that plan i is implemented at time t, αt is an unspecified 
function of time, xit is a vector of time-dependent variables (covariates), and β is a 
vector of parameters which is unknown. In this model, the discrete-time estimated 
coefficients are also estimates of the underlying continuous-time model and the 
coefficient vector is invariant to the length of the time interval. Thus, the two problems 
of the probit model referred to above are avoided by the proportional hazards 
specification. 
 Using the proportional hazards model, I have re-estimated the regressions of 
columns 1 to 3 of Table 4. Results, shown in columns 4 to 6 of Table 7, are very similar 
to those of the probit model. Therefore, the conclusions regarding the support for the 
testable hypotheses remain the same. 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical results of this article show that some political variables are 
important determinants of the timing of stabilizations. Probit and proportional hazards 
estimations over a panel of 10 countries and 27 stabilization attempts clearly support the 
hypothesis that higher fragmentation of the political system generally leads to delays of 
stabilizations. Since higher fragmentation of the political system tends to lead to higher 
polarization and political instability, these results are consistent with the “war of 
attrition” model of Alesina and Drazen (1991) and with the findings of Cukierman, 
Edwards, and Tabellini (1992) regarding the effect of political instability on inflation. 
 Higher inflation seems to hasten stabilizations, as suggested by the “benefits of 
crises” model of Drazen and Grilli (1993) and by the distributional conflict and optimal 
control models. There is also some support for the hypothesis that authoritarian regimes 
hasten stabilizations, but evidence is found only for those cases in which political 
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parties are not allowed. Little or no evidence was found of opportunistic business cycles 
or partisan effects. 
Finally, empirical results do not seem to support the hypothesis of Orphanides 
(1996a,b) that the decision of starting or delaying a stabilization program is essentially 
based on the available amount of foreign reserves. Nevertheless, we cannot completely 
discard that hypotheses because expected reserves, for which there is no data, may be a 
more important variable than actual reserves. 
 In sum, it seems that the structure of the political system may help explain why 
suboptimal (inflationary) policies are kept for long periods of time and the necessary 
corrective actions are not taken. Countries whose electoral systems are highly 
proportional tend to have a higher number of parties represented in parliament, 
generally leading to higher political polarization and instability. Then, conflicts of 
interests between political parties make the approval of new legislation harder and 
stabilization programs are often delayed until a serious crisis sets in. 
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1 For surveys on this literature, see: Alesina (1994), Drazen (1996), Rodrik (1993), and Rodrik (1996). 
2 Alesina and Tabellini (1989) present a model along the same lines. Similar evidence regarding the 
effects of political instability is found by Edwards and Tabellini (1991), and Roubini (1991). 
3 Mainwaring and Scully (1995, pp. 28-33) argue that the most polarized political systems in Latin 
America are also the most fragmented. Roubini and Sachs (1989) showed for industrial countries that the 
degree of fragmentation of the political system is directly related to the public debt, given the difficulty of 
parties to agree on fiscal stabilization in more fragmented party systems. Here, I will test the related 
hypothesis that higher fragmentation leads to greater delays of inflation stabilization programs. 
4 This hypothesis is also consistent with the optimal control models of Orphanides (1996a,b) and with the 
class conflict models of Laban and Sturzenegger (1994a,b) and Mondino, et al. (1996), that stress the 
importance of capital flight in the process of increasing inflation. We should note that at very high levels 
of inflation, currency substitution might be even more important. As Bernholz (1995) points out, the 
public tends to restrict its use of the inflating money during hyperinflations or advanced inflations. As 
they substitute the national currency by the foreign one(s), the real stock of money shrinks, decreasing the 
base for the inflation tax. High inflation will also decrease the revenue from normal taxes because of the 
time lags between the assessment, payment and expenditure of tax revenues (Olivera-Tanzi effect). In 
such a situation, a stabilization is the last effort of the government to prevent losing its tax power 
completely. Since currency substitution is usually illegal, it is impossible for me to get data on it for all 
the countries studied and evaluate its effect on the timing of stabilizations. See Bernholz (1996) for an 
empirical study for which data on currency substitution was available - the Soviet hyperinflation of 1922-
1924. 
5 On political business cycle and partisan theories, see: Alesina (1994). 
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6 See Bruno, et al. (1988), Bruno, et al. (1991), Calvo and Végh (1994), Kiguel and Leviatan (1992), 
Pastor (1992), Hoffmaister and Végh (1996), and Végh (1992). 
7 For some countries, only annual data is available on some variables and, sometimes, there is no data at 
all for earlier decades. I used straight-line interpolation to generate quarterly data and I also interpolated 
the series assuming that these were AR1 (auto-regressive or order 1) or RW1 (random walk of order 1). 
Although these interpolation techniques may not be the most correct ones, especially for GDP, results 
were not driven by the way annual data was interpolated. Results using straight-line interpolation or the 
other interpolation techniques are very similar to those obtained when one works only with the available 
quarterly data or when annual data is used instead of quarterly data. An appendix containing some of 
these results is available from the author upon request. 
8 Three dummy variables based on Frag were created: Frag=1, Frag=2, and Frag>2. The 4 degrees of 
fragmentation used by Roubini and Sachs (1989) would correspond to the values 2 to 5 of Frag. To 
account for dictatorships, one more degree of fragmentation was considered (“1- No parties allowed or 
exclusive one-party systems”). Since there were no stabilizations being implemented when Frag was 
equal to 4 or 5, it was not possible to create dummy variables for these cases and include them in the set 
of regressors, because they would totally predict the value of the dependent variable (STAB=0). Thus, 
only three dummies were created and the first two were included in the set of explanatory variables. 
9 According to the partisan business cycle of Hibbs (1977), leftist governments are more prone to 
inflation than rightist governments. The classification used for this variable follows Haggard and 
Kaufman (1992). 
10 The fact that 3 out of 4 stabilization programs implemented when inflation was not high according to 
my definition (Argentina, 1967.2; Chile, 1978.1; and Uruguay, 1978.4) resulted from decisions of 
authoritarian regimes that did not allow political parties also seems to support the hypothesis that higher 
fragmentation increases delays. Furthermore, in the fourth case, Mexico 1987.4, there was a dominant 
party in power, the PRI, that always got an overall majority in the Mexican Parliament (actually, Mexico 
was most of the time the least fragmented of the democratic regimes). 
11 F.Ind is the Laakso and Taegepera (1979) measure of the effective number of parties in Parliament 
with parties being weighted according to their size. The greater the index, the greater are the effective 
number of parties and fragmentation. According to Maiwaring and Scully (1995, p. 31) polarization or 
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the “ideological distance tends to widen as the effective number of parties increases.” 
12 This variable was not included in the estimations of columns 1 to 4 because when Frag=1 takes the 
value of one Type is also equal to one, resulting in high correlation of these variables, 66.89%, which 
could lead to problems of multicolinearity. 
13 One direct way of testing whether “strong” dictators tend to stabilize faster than “weak” dictators or not 
would be to create a dummy variable representing the latter and include it in the estimation of column 
one, so that its coefficient could be compared to that of Frag=1. Unfortunately, that is not possible 
because in this sample there is not a single case in which a “weak” dictator implements an inflation 
stabilization program. Thus, a dummy variable representing “weak” dictators would totally predict the 
value of the dependent variable (STAB=0).  
14 An Appendix containing these results is available from the author upon request. 
15 The deviations from trend were obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott decomposition method. 
16 An Appendix with these results is available from the author upon request. 
17 See Allison (1982) for an example with a Logit model. He also compares the results of two Logit 
models, with one assuming that the hazard rate does not change autonomously over time, and the other 
relaxing that constraint by adding year dummies to the list of regressors. 
18 Since the data set is composed of quarterly data, the inclusion of quarterly dummies reflecting the 
duration of high inflation before stabilization would be ideal, but that was not possible because for many 
quarters there were no stabilizations being implemented. This means that the dummies for these quarters 
would completely predict the value of the dependent variable (STAB=0). Thus, I decided to create yearly 
dummies instead. Since the longest period of high inflation was of 27 quarters, corresponding to almost 7 
years, only seven dummies were created (6 for the first six years of high inflation before a stabilization, 
and a 7th for all the remaining years). The creation of additional year dummies was not possible because 
these would totally predict the value of the dependent variable. 
19 For a description of the proportional hazards model, see: Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), Allison 
(1982), and Jenkins (1995). 
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Table 1: Hypotheses related to the literature presented 
 
Hypotheses tested and related literature Variables 
used 
Expected signs of 
coefficients 
1 – Higher fragmentation of the political system leads to 
delays of stabilizations: 
Alesina and Drazen (1991), Alesina and Tabellini 
(1989), Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992), and 
Roubini and Sachs (1989). 
 
Frag = 1 
Frag = 2 
F.Ind 
 
+ 
+ 
- 
2 – Higher inflation hastens stabilizations: 
Alesina and Drazen (1991), Drazen and Grilli (1993), 
Laban and Sturzenegger (1994a,b), Mondino et al. 
(1996), and Orphanides (1996a,b). 
 
Ln(Inf) 
 
+ 
3 – Greater amount of reserves hastens stabilizations: 
Optimal control models of Orphanides (1996a,b) 
TR/Imp 
TRgr 
TrdevT 
+ 
+ 
+ 
4 – Stabilizations come faster in authoritarian regimes than 
in democracies: 
Haggard and Kaufman (1992) 
Frag = 1 
 
Type 
+ 
Frag=1 > Frag=2 
+ 
5 – Rightist governments are more prone to stabilize than 
leftist ones: 
Partisan model of Hibbs (1977) 
Orient 
Right 
- 
+ 
6 – Governments are more prone to stabilize in the beginning 
of their terms than towards the end: 
Political business cycle model of Nordhaus (1975) 
QLCH 
QLCH ≤ 4 
- 
+ 
Notes: 
– See Table 3 for a description of the variables used; 
– When “Frag=1 > Frag=2” is indicated along with the expected sign of a coefficient, it means 
that it is also necessary that the estimated coefficient associated with Frag=1 is greater than 
the one associated with Frag=2 to support the tested hypothesis. 
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Table 2: Stabilization Programs 
 
Country Program dates / names Type Duration of “high” inflation 
until stabilization (quarters) 
Argentina 1959.3 ERBS 4 
 1967.2 ERBS 0 
 1973.3 ERBS 6 
 1978.4 (Tablita) ERBS 15 
 1985.1(Austral) ERBS 14 
 1990.1 (Bonex) MBS 11 
 1991.2 (Convertibility) ERBS 1 
Bolivia 1985.4 ERBS 14 
Brazil 1964:2 ERBS 4 
 1986:1 (Cruzado) ERBS 22 
 1990.2 (Collor) MBS 13 
 1994.3 (Real) ERBS 14 
Chile 1975.2 MBS 11 
 1978.1 (Tablita) ERBS 0 
Dominican Republic 1985.2 ERBS 4 
 1991.2 MBS 13 
Israel 1985.3 (Shekel) ERBS 27 
Mexico 1976.4 ERBS 0 
 1988.1 ERBS 5 
Peru 1981.3 ERBS 22 
 1985.4 ERBS 10 
 1990.3 MBS 11 
Turkey 1980.1 ERBS 12 
Uruguay 1960.4 MBS 7 
 1968.2 ERBS 11 
 1978.4 (Tablita) ERBS 0 
 1991.3 MBS 5 
Sources: Bruno, et al. (1988), Bruno, et al. (1991), Calvo and Végh (1994), Kiguel and 
Leviatan (1992), Pastor (1992), Hoffmaister and Végh (1996), and Végh (1992). 
Notes:  ERBS = Exchange Rate Based Stabilization (20 in this sample); 
 MBS = Money Based Stabilization (7 in this sample). 
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Table 3: Description of the Variables Used and Respective Sources 
Political variables: 
Frag - Degree of fragmentation of the political system: 
1 no parties allowed or exclusive one-party systems; 
2 one-party majority parliamentary government; or presidential government, with the 
same party in control of the parliament (with an overall majority); 
>2 More fragmented political systems. 
F.Ind - Fragmentation Index of the distribution of seats in the lower house of the parliament: 
F Ind
pi
. = ∑
1
2 , where pi  = percentage of seats of party i. 
Type - Type of political system: 
1 = m military dictatorship or authoritarian government backed by the military; 
0 = d democracy. 
Orient - Political orientation of the government: 
1 conservative, antilabor or antileft government; 
2 center-right government or coalition of center-right and center-left parties; 
3 center-left government; 
4 socialist or populist government. 
Right – Right, center right, or coalition of center-right and center-left parties government: 
1 (Orient=1 or Orient=2); 
0 (Orient=3 or Orient=4). 
QLCH -  Quarters since last change in government or election 
Economic variables: 
Ln(Inf) – Natural log of Growth of CPI since the same quarter of the previous year 
TR/Imp - Total Reserves as a Percentage of Imports 
TRgr – Growth in Total Reserves since the same quarter of the previous year 
TrdevT – Percentage deviation from Trend (Hodrick-Prescott) of Total Reserves 
IMFProgram = 1 if there was an IMF arrangement in the same year, and zero otherwise 
TFC - Total IMF credit and loans outstanding 
FB/GDP - Fiscal Balance (Government Budget Balance) as a Percentage of GDP 
GDP - Growth of Real GDP since the same quarter of the previous year 
Sources:  
- Political variables: Banks A. ed., Political Handbook of the World, several issues; Dornbusch 
and Edwards (1991); Gorvin (1989); Haggard and Kaufman (1992); McDonald and Ruhl 
(1989); Mainwaring and Scully (1995);World Europa Yearbook, several issues. For tables 
containing the data on the political variables see: Veiga (1998). 
- Economic variables: International Financial Statistics - IMF. Quarterly data on Real GDP was 
also obtained from IBGE (Brazil), INEGI (Mexico), and Végh (1992), for Chile (1977:1 to 
1979:4) and Uruguay (1978:1 to 1983:4). Data on IMFProgram is based on Table 3 of 
Knight and Santaella (1997), for the period 1973-91, and on information available in the 
IMF web page for the following years (1992-96). 
  29
Table 4: Probability of Starting a Stabilization Program 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Frag = 1 .842 
(2.36)** 
[14.5] 
.895 
(2.70)*** 
[15.8] 
.952 
(2.89)*** 
[17.5] 
.890 
(2.69)*** 
[15.7] 
 1.130 
(2.18)** 
[22.3] 
Frag = 2 .805 
(2.88)*** 
[11.4] 
.810 
(2.90)*** 
[11.5] 
.858 
(3.11)*** 
[12.6] 
.806 
(2.88)*** 
[11.4] 
 .919 
(2.89)*** 
[13.5] 
F.Ind     -.181 
(-1.87)* 
[-2.52] 
.081 
(.78) 
[1.08] 
Ln(Inf) (-1) .309 
(3.07)*** 
[4.12] 
.314 
(3.12)*** 
[4.19] 
.327 
(3.29)*** 
[4.40] 
.314 
(3.12)*** 
[4.20] 
.303 
(2.84)*** 
[4.22] 
.274 
(2.48)** 
[3.65] 
TR/Imp (-1) -.029 
(-.27) 
[-.387] 
-.029 
(-.280) 
[-.391] 
-.040 
(-.38) 
[-.539] 
-.029 
(-.28) 
[-.396] 
-.009 
(-.09) 
[-.130] 
-.036 
(-.34) 
[-.487] 
Type     -.571 
(-1.44) 
[-5.52] 
 
Orient -.056 
(-.40) 
[-.75] 
   -.216 
(-1.47) 
[-3.02] 
-.047 
(-.33) 
[-.627] 
Right  .022 
(.84) 
[.244] 
.034 
(.13) 
[.379] 
.025 
(.09) 
[.273] 
  
QLCH -.028 
(-1.30) 
[-.386] 
-.030 
(-1.35) 
[-.400] 
 -.036 
(-1.10) 
[-.493] 
-.040 
(-1.90)* 
[-.558] 
-.026 
(-1.18) 
[-.354] 
QLCH ≤ 4   .201 
(.85) 
[2.33] 
-.098 
(-.28) 
[-1.04] 
  
FB/GDP (-1) .044 
(1.64)* 
[.597] 
.046 
(1.68)* 
[.620] 
.050 
(1.82)* 
[.681] 
.044 
(1.59) 
[.597] 
.047 
(1.84)* 
[.664] 
.042 
(1.55) 
[.564] 
GDP (-1) .060 
(2.25)** 
[.807] 
.059 
(2.24)** 
[.793] 
.058 
(2.24)** 
[.779] 
.059 
(2.23)** 
[.792] 
.060 
(2.31)** 
[.849] 
.057 
(2.08)** 
[.760] 
Log Likelihood -76.43 -76.51 -77.13 -76.47 -79.66 -76.12 
McFadden R2 .1655 .1646 .1579 .1650 .1302 .1689 
Observations 309 309 309 309 309 309 
Schwarz B.I.C. -99.36 -99.44 -100.06 -102.27 -102.59 -101.92 
Sources:  see Table 3. 
Notes: - t-statistics are in parentheses;  
- the marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of starting a 
stabilization are in brackets; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- models estimated with a constant, by Maximum Likelihood (ML). 
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Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 Alternative definitions of high inflation Restricted samples 
 Inf≥100% or 
Inf ≥ 2MA of 
last 5 years 
Inf ≥50% Inf ≥ 100% Latin 
America 
South 
America 
1970:1 
to 
1996:4 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Frag = 1 .817 
(2.49)** 
.768 
(2.05)** 
.603 
(1.35) 
 .785 
(2.15)** 
.889 
(2.12)** 
.730 
(2.06)** 
Frag = 2 .862 
(3.05)*** 
.728 
(2.43)** 
1.051 
(2.98)***
 .774 
(2.56)** 
.741 
(2.01)** 
.806 
(2.74)***
Frag ≤ 2    .912 
(2.76)***
   
Ln(Inf) (-1) .306 
(3.02)*** 
.333 
(3.01)***
.285 
(2.16)** 
.298 
(2.29)** 
.284 
(2.69)***
.335 
(2.78)*** 
.321 
(3.09)***
TR/Imp (-1) -.020 
(-.18) 
-.027 
(-.25) 
.015 
(.12) 
.023 
(.19) 
-.004 
(-.04) 
-.034 
(-.29) 
-.014 
(-.12) 
Right .100 
(.37) 
.008 
(.02) 
.010 
(.02) 
-.086 
(-.24) 
.002 
(.008) 
-.019 
(-.05) 
-.035 
(-.12) 
QLCH -.028 
(-1.27) 
-.030 
(-1.28) 
-.036 
(-1.28) 
-.032 
(-1.16) 
-.026 
(-1.19) 
-.040 
(-1.37) 
-.034 
(-1.43) 
FB/GDP (-1) .046 
(1.68)* 
.038 
(1.36) 
.033 
(1.06) 
.033 
(1.06) 
.044 
(1.50) 
.053 
(1.39) 
.049 
(1.70)* 
GDP (-1) .059 
(2.21)** 
.050 
(1.83)* 
.062 
(1.74)* 
.063 
(1.81)* 
.050 
(1.88)* 
.062 
(2.06)** 
.063 
(2.15)** 
Log Likelihood -61.53 -62.43 -45.76 -46.32 -71.64 -57.86 -62.99 
McFadden R2 .1603 .1677 .1967 .1867 .1337 .1696 .1809 
Observations 290 256 187 187 264 224 278 
Stabilizations 27 22 17 17 25 21 22 
Sources:  see Table 3. 
Notes: - t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- models estimated with a constant, by Maximum Likelihood (ML). 
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Table 6: Results when only Exchange Rate Based Stabilizations are considered 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Frag = 1 1.250 
(3.11)*** 
1.197 
(3.00)*** 
1.216 
(3.10)*** 
1.20 
(3.09)*** 
1.182 
(3.06)*** 
1.224 
(2.68)*** 
Frag = 2 1.004 
(2.95)*** 
.973 
(2.93)*** 
.971 
(2.91)*** 
.961 
(2.90)*** 
.954 
(2.88)*** 
1.056 
(2.94)*** 
Ln(Inf) (-1) .201 
(1.76)* 
.256 
(2.42)** 
.252 
(2.38)** 
.243 
(2.22)** 
.246 
(2.30)** 
.292 
(2.55)** 
TR/Imp (-1) .170 
(1.52) 
     
TRgr (-1)  -.00008 
(-.09) 
    
TRdevT (-1)   .002 
(.98) 
   
TFC (-1)    .00005 
(.44) 
  
∆TFC(-1)     -.0001 
(-.41) 
 
IMFProgram      -.530 
(-1.48) 
Right -.266 
(-.90) 
-.203 
(-.71) 
-.215 
(-.75) 
-.190 
(-.65) 
-.194 
(-.67) 
-.268 
(-.83) 
QLCH -.026 
(-1.09) 
-.095 
(-.83) 
-.021 
(-.90) 
-.022 
(-.91) 
-.020 
(-.84) 
-.020 
(-.78) 
FB/GDP (-1) .015 
(.52) 
.038 
(.80) 
.022 
(.75) 
.026 
(.86) 
.022 
(.76) 
.032 
(1.02) 
GDP (-1) .069 
(2.25)** 
.070 
(2.32)** 
.072 
(2.35)** 
.068 
(2.26)** 
.069 
(2.32)** 
.075 
(2.16)** 
Log Likelihood -61.53 -62.66 -62.22 -62.60 -62.60 -49.72 
McFadden R2 .1694 .1534 .1601 .1550 .1550 .1852 
# Observations 309 308 309 309 309 275 
# Stabilizations 20 20 20 20 20 16 
Sources:  see Table 3. 
Notes: 
- t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- models estimated with a constant, by Maximum Likelihood (ML); 
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Table 7: Probit with year dummies and Proportional Hazards 
 
 Probit with year dummies Proportional Hazards 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Frag = 1 1.307 
(3.04)*** 
1.331 
(3.30)*** 
1.379 
(3.48)*** 
2.159 
(3.05)*** 
2.239 
(3.16)*** 
2.343 
(3.34)*** 
Frag = 2 1.221 
(3.45)*** 
1.236 
(3.46)*** 
1.277 
(3.64)*** 
2.022 
(3.02)*** 
2.093 
(3.01)*** 
2.199 
(3.16)*** 
Ln(Inf) (-1) .275 
(2.14)** 
.285 
(2.19)** 
.298 
(2.34)** 
.528 
(2.44)** 
.559 
(2.45)** 
.587 
(2.46)** 
TR/Imp (-1) -.117 
(-.95) 
-.117 
(-.95) 
-.124 
(-1.01) 
-.338 
(-1.16) 
-.337 
(-1.14) 
-.350 
(-1.11) 
Orient .025 
(.16) 
  .079 
(.21) 
  
Right  -.141 
(-.48) 
-.143 
(-.49) 
 -.397 
(-.59) 
-.372 
(-.56) 
QLCH -.015 
(-.63) 
-.015 
(-.63) 
 -.028 
(-.52) 
-.029 
(-.56) 
 
QLCH ≤ 4   .093 
(.35) 
  .081 
(.15) 
FB/GDP (-1) .061 
(1.98)** 
.064 
(2.03)** 
.067 
(2.10)** 
.107 
(1.57) 
.117 
(1.64)* 
.118 
(1.67)* 
GDP (-1) .053 
(1.72)* 
.052 
(1.68)* 
.051 
(1.67)* 
.070 
(1.22) 
.066 
(1.15) 
.064 
(1.13) 
1st year -1.46 
(-1.81)* 
-1.53 
(-1.86)* 
-1.58 
(-1.89)* 
-2.49 
(-1.85)* 
-2.70 
(-1.92)* 
-2.83 
(-1.86)* 
2nd year -1.22 
(-1.53) 
-1.30 
(-1.59) 
-1.36 
(-1.66)* 
-2.30 
(-1.73)* 
-2.55 
(-1.75)* 
-2.70 
(-1.73)* 
3rd year -1.71 
(-2.04)** 
-1.79 
(-2.09)** 
-1.86 
(-2.16)** 
-3.22 
(-2.30)** 
-3.46 
(-2.32)** 
-3.62 
(-2.36)** 
4th year -.199 
(-.26) 
-.266 
(-.34) 
-.306 
(-.39) 
-.532 
(-.45) 
-.732 
(-.58) 
-.852 
(-.66) 
5th year -.739 
(-.76) 
-.794 
(-.81) 
-.859 
(-.89) 
-1.20 
(-.80) 
-1.33 
(-.89) 
-1.44 
(-.98) 
6th year -.488 
(-.57) 
-.539 
(-.62) 
-.552 
(-.64) 
-.931 
(-.61) 
-1.03 
(-.69) 
-1.11 
(-.73) 
Log Likelihood -68.43 -68.33 -68.47 -68.30 -68.09 -68.28 
McFadden R2 .2528 .2539 .2523 .1863 .1889 .1867 
Observations 309 309 309 309 309 309 
Schwarz Bayesian. 
Information Criterion 
-114.30 -114.20 -114.34 -114.17 -113.96 -114.15 
Sources:  see Table 3. 
Notes: - t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- models estimated with a constant and six year dummies, by Maximum Likelihood (ML). 
